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After a concerted and well-publicized campaign to legitimize the necessity of inoculating all United
States (US) military forces against anthrax, the US Secretary of Defense has decided to change the
policy. The US will now inoculate only those forces most at risk to weaponized anthrax--primarily those
forces in South Korea and Kuwait. The rationale for the change is that the US supply of vaccine is running
out.
This denouement joins a host of problems with the original policy of mass inoculation. First, the
biological warfare threat could easily be changed to another agent, even another variant of anthrax.
Second, the incidence and prevalence of inoculation side effects through time has not been wellresearched. Third, legitimate concerns with the first two points by capable military personnel led to
some of them refusing to receive the inoculations and then being forced out of the military. And now US
resolve to see a policy carried out has been derailed by a vaccine shortage--resulting from a
manufacture shutdown at the only plant making the vaccine due to violations of safety, consistency,
record-keeping, and sterility. Furthermore, a former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an unpaid
board member of the corporation that owns the plant and may have an 11% interest in that
corporation--raising (however, unwarranted) suspicions of special interests and dispensations.
It is quite probable that the inoculation program was significantly intended to signal US determination to
confront current and future foes. This example of biopolitics, however, seems to have done the
opposite. (See Anthrax vaccinations: Saddam wins again. (May 1, 1998). IBPP, 4(17); Derakhshan, F., &
Fatehi, K. (1985). Bureaucracy as a leadership substitute: A review of history. Leadership and
Organization Development Journal, 6, 13-16; Elliott, A. (1995). Symptoms of globalization: or, Mapping
reflexivity in the postmodern age. Political Psychology, 16, 719-736; Klugman, J. (1986). The psychology
of Soviet corruption, indiscipline, and resistance to reform. Political Psychology, 7, 67-82; Sciolino, E.
(July 11, 2000). Shortage forces pentagon to cut anthrax inoculations. The New York Times, p. A14;
Williams, N. M., Sjoberg, G., & Sjoberg, A. F. The bureaucratic personality: An alternate view. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 16, 389-405.) (Keywords: Anthrax, Biopolitics, Mass Inoculation, Military.)
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